In 2003, South African writer J. M. Coetzee was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature for his riveting portrayals of racial repression, sexual politics, the guises of reason, and the hypocrisy of human beings toward animals and nature. Coetzee was credited with being "a scrupulous doubter, ruthless in his criticism of the cruel rationalism and cosmetic morality of western civilization." The film of his novel _Disgrace_, starring John Malkovich, brought his challenging ideas to a new audience. Anton Leist and (...) Peter Singer have assembled an outstanding group of contributors who probe deeply into Coetzee's extensive and extraordinary corpus. They explore his approach to ethical theory and philosophy and pay particular attention to his representation of the human-animal relationship. They also confront Coetzee's depiction of the elementary conditions of life, the origins of morality, the recognition of value in others, the sexual dynamics between men and women, the normality of suppression, and the possibility of equality in postcolonial society. With its wide-ranging consideration of philosophical issues, especially in relation to fiction, this volume stands alone in its extraordinary exchange of ethical and literary inquiry. (shrink)

This collection takes stock of J.M. Coetzee's impact from a number of interesting angles, Including animals, sexuality, race, and reason. The time is truly ripe for such a volume.

Title from title page of source document.

Preface The editors of this volume wish to express their appreciation for the trust which the officers and membership of the Society for Ancient Greek ...

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The American way of Renaissance and the Humanistic Tradition of Greece -- The Aristotelian tradition in American naturalism -- George Santayana and Greek philosophy -- Frederick J.E. Woodbridge and the Aristotelian tradition -- John Dewey and ancient philosophies -- John H. Randall Jr.'s interpretation of Greek philosophy -- The ontology of Herbert W. Schneider -- Ernest Nagel's pragmatism and Aristotle's principle of contradiction -- The naturalistic metaphysics of Justus Buchler -- Naturalism and the platonic tradition.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews How Philosophy Uses Its Past. By John Herman Randall, Jr. Foreword by Cornelius Krus~. (The Matehette Lectures, Wesleyan University, 1961; New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1963. Pp. xiv + 106. $3.50.) One could easily characterize this small volume as a minor masterpiece on a major theme. It is an admirable statement from the pen of one of America's leading thinkers in both the history of (...) philosopy and philosophy "proper." Actually the distinction between these two fields of philosophic activity becomes superfluous since Professor Randall has an elaborate theory of his own, whereby to do philosophy and do it well involves, in a serious and inescapable way, competent performance in the history of philosophy. How Philosophy UsesIts Past may have to be read, and I propose here that it should, as the general introduction to Randall's projected three volumes of his monumental The Career of Philosophy, of which only Volume One has been published. The close analyses of specific men and issues presented in the latter work can be seen as the evidence meant to corroborate the thesis asserted in How Philosophy Uses Its Past. In his own words: "It remains true that it is impossible to gain insight into the history of philosophical ideas--into the dimensions of philosophizing--without being led to formulate a philosophy of cultural change" (p. 20). Randall has made in this volume a significant contribution if only by way of focusing his powerful lens on three central issues: (1) how genuine philosophizing is still "metaphysical" thinking; (2) why it is necessary to undertake a thorough investigation of the antecedents leading up to our prevailing philosophies of experience; (3) how to understand the seemingly chaotic situation in our philosophical affairs, under the age-old distinction of the "one and many." In a critical and appreciative article on Lovejoy, Randall stated his reservations toward Lovejoy's "atomistic" conception of intellectual history and proceeded to note that the history of philosophy has a philosophic function iust as philosophy has historical dimensions such that when adequately explored can tell us much about the nature and limits of our own philosophizing.1 A permeative thesis in the volume under review is that to do "history of philosophy" is to do "philosophy." To show how and why Randall believes this to be the case, we must consider in some detail three of his main themes: the redefinition of metaphysics, the broader conception of experience, and the "one and many" aspect of contemporary philosophy. One may go so far as to say that Randall is doing philosophy just as he is formulating a theory of the philosophy, for the sake of responding philosophically to the stated problems. But to respond philosophically is something that one must learn in conjunction with the examination of the historical past of philosophy. Randall thus believes, on the evidence gathered, that philosophy has revealed itself to be "a clarification and criticism of fundamental beliefs involved in all the great enterprises of human culture, science, art, religion, the moral, social and practical activity, when some new idea or some altered experience has impinged upon them and generated intellectual tensions and maladjustments" (pp. 19; 100). This way of understanding philosophy affects his approach to every problem he mentions. Indeed, even the denial of the importance of the history of philosophy is rooted in historical processes which must be understood before the denial can be fully illumined. Without historical knowledge, he argues even our decisions will suffer (p. 14). Randall calls his approach to defining philosophical problems "operational." Accordingly, we do not know whether we have a philosophical problem until a philosophical response has occurred. Looking back from the response to what it was that philosophers responded to, we See Randall's "Arthur O. Lovejoy and the History of Ideas," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,XXII (1963), 475-479; also book under review, p. 36. [1071 108 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY discover that these were problems that emerged "whenever strife of ideas and experiences forced men back to the fundamental assumptions in any field" (p. 18). Briefly put, the response has always been that of analysing, clarifying, criticizing and reconstructing "fundamental assumptions." The problems vary and... (shrink)

" This volume has provided the rare opportunity to present related work of several eminent scholars in different fields. Most of the essays were written to honor Professor Randall on the occasion of his 65th birthday.

"John Anton introduces the reader to the poetry and poetics of Constantine P. Cavafy from a different perspective. He traces Cavafy's development during the early phases of the poet's creativity, when he was gradually discovering his poetic self, until he finally created his own authentic voice. Autobiographical elements in Cavafy's poems are introduced mainly as guides to explore one aspect of Cavafy's world: how he gradually learned to control the transformation of experience into "work in progress". Professor Anton (...) clearly portrays Cavafy's quality of thought, his originality, the freshness of his imagery and his penetrating commentary on the human condition. The author also provides details of the historical background of ancient Alexandria, which formed one of the key ways whereby Cavafy recreated the city for himself and used it to develop his unique poetic vision."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

Induction–recursion is a powerful definition method in intuitionistic type theory. It extends inductive definitions and allows us to define all standard sets of Martin-Löf type theory as well as a large collection of commonly occurring inductive data structures. It also includes a variety of universes which are constructive analogues of inaccessibles and other large cardinals below the first Mahlo cardinal. In this article we give a new compact formalization of inductive–recursive definitions by modeling them as initial algebras in slice categories. (...) We give generic formation, introduction, elimination, and equality rules generalizing the usual rules of type theory. Moreover, we prove that the elimination and equality rules are equivalent to the principle of the existence of initial algebras for certain endofunctors. We also show the equivalence of the current formulation with the formulation of induction–recursion as a reflection principle given in Dybjer and Setzer 93). Finally, we discuss two type-theoretic analogues of Mahlo cardinals in set theory: an external Mahlo universe which is defined by induction–recursion and captured by our formalization, and an internal Mahlo universe, which goes beyond induction–recursion. We show that the external Mahlo universe, and therefore also the theory of inductive–recursive definitions, have proof-theoretical strength of at least Rathjen's theory KPM. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:260 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY and 8, although hc proposed no emendation of the text. [Raven's work is nowhere mentioned by Loenen, not even in connection with fr. 4 where he and Raven are in agreement, yet where he says "... all present-day authors assume this passage to refer to the material world," Raven believes with Loenen that the passage does not refer to the material world.] With regard to (...) Loenen's sensu stricto ~ar~, all commentators realized that Parmenides was at least some of the time using ~a~Lto denote necessity of existence and essence. Loenen does valuable work in emphasising this, but the observation is not revolutionarily original. Vlastos, following yon Fritz, argued (in Gnomon [1953]) that, for Parmenides, nothing exists but thought. Vlastos' arguments were not on as many fronts as are Loenen's, and Loenen develops the interpretation much further. Aristotle and Simplicius were the first of many who believed Parmenides to be a dualist, to have posited two worlds, fa ata~ra and ~& ~a~a, between which there was no causal relationship. Although there is much originality in Loenen's development and argument for his theses, it is nevertheless true that on the three grounds on which he lays claim to originality (introduction, pp. 3-5), his views have considerable precedents. M. C. SCHOLAR St. John's College, Cambridge Plato and the Individual. By Robert William Hall. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963. Pp. 224.) Professor Hall's main thesis is that Plato's ethical thought underwent a gradual and significant development and that in the face of this fact the mature Plato is neither a halfhearted moral philosopher, nor a utilitarian, but completely committed to the substantiality and immortality of the soul. The first issue is raised so that the claim that Plato reserved the ethical ideal only for the specialists in philosophical reflection can be dismissed as groundless. The second problem is discussed in order to demonstrate beyond doubt that Plato's later moral views went beyond the limited ethics of consequences that dominates the early Socratic dialogues. But it is the third issue that constitutes the core of Hall's book, and the discussion here is undertaken in order to identify the metaphysical principle to which Plato appealed when he reconstructed his ethics from an initially quite aristocratic affair into a publicly available ideal that was rendered universal in scope and attainment. Dr. Hall argues that if knowledge of the Forms is unconditionally required for genuine morality, then only the philosophically gifted can rise to the lofty occasion. Being himself a strong advocate of a moral ideal open to all human beings, Dr. Hall does not hesitate to challenge Plato's views with this formidable problem: If we suppose Plato's views grant to the ordinary individual nothing more than a second class morality, he hardly deserves his reputation as a great ethical thinker. In line with this question the author devotes the entire first chapter to an interesting discussion on the sources of modern democratic individualism as supported by the best in the Christian tradition and then uses his findings to test the strength of Plato's moral fiber. But the author knows all along that Plato will emerge unscathed. His purpo~ then is not so much to show that Plato actually held that view as it is to take the reader through the meandering paths only the modem scholar and erudite interpreter of the dialogues know how to travel best and by which it is believed Plato himself must have been able to reach the summit of the superb answer. Since Dr. Hall discerns two different available moralities in Plato, an "aristocratic" and a "demotic," he also finds it necessary to distinguish between the morality of the excellences of the individual man and the excellence of the philosopher. When all is told, it turns out that Plato's development as an ethical philosopher moves from a high-minded kind of utilitarianism based on arete, inherited from Socrates, to a non-utilitarian conception of virtue which is Plato's own discovery and contribution. The pivotal point is found to be in the Republic where the central problem is to justify the inherent value of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews How Philosophy Uses Its Past. By John Herman Randall, Jr. Foreword by Cornelius Krus~. (The Matehette Lectures, Wesleyan University, 1961; New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1963. Pp. xiv + 106. $3.50.) One could easily characterize this small volume as a minor masterpiece on a major theme. It is an admirable statement from the pen of one of America's leading thinkers in both the history of (...) philosopy and philosophy "proper." Actually the distinction between these two fields of philosophic activity becomes superfluous since Professor Randall has an elaborate theory of his own, whereby to do philosophy and do it well involves, in a serious and inescapable way, competent performance in the history of philosophy. How Philosophy UsesIts Past may have to be read, and I propose here that it should, as the general introduction to Randall's projected three volumes of his monumental The Career of Philosophy, of which only Volume One has been published. The close analyses of specific men and issues presented in the latter work can be seen as the evidence meant to corroborate the thesis asserted in How Philosophy Uses Its Past. In his own words: "It remains true that it is impossible to gain insight into the history of philosophical ideas--into the dimensions of philosophizing--without being led to formulate a philosophy of cultural change" (p. 20). Randall has made in this volume a significant contribution if only by way of focusing his powerful lens on three central issues: (1) how genuine philosophizing is still "metaphysical" thinking; (2) why it is necessary to undertake a thorough investigation of the antecedents leading up to our prevailing philosophies of experience; (3) how to understand the seemingly chaotic situation in our philosophical affairs, under the age-old distinction of the "one and many." In a critical and appreciative article on Lovejoy, Randall stated his reservations toward Lovejoy's "atomistic" conception of intellectual history and proceeded to note that the history of philosophy has a philosophic function iust as philosophy has historical dimensions such that when adequately explored can tell us much about the nature and limits of our own philosophizing.1 A permeative thesis in the volume under review is that to do "history of philosophy" is to do "philosophy." To show how and why Randall believes this to be the case, we must consider in some detail three of his main themes: the redefinition of metaphysics, the broader conception of experience, and the "one and many" aspect of contemporary philosophy. One may go so far as to say that Randall is doing philosophy just as he is formulating a theory of the philosophy, for the sake of responding philosophically to the stated problems. But to respond philosophically is something that one must learn in conjunction with the examination of the historical past of philosophy. Randall thus believes, on the evidence gathered, that philosophy has revealed itself to be "a clarification and criticism of fundamental beliefs involved in all the great enterprises of human culture, science, art, religion, the moral, social and practical activity, when some new idea or some altered experience has impinged upon them and generated intellectual tensions and maladjustments" (pp. 19; 100). This way of understanding philosophy affects his approach to every problem he mentions. Indeed, even the denial of the importance of the history of philosophy is rooted in historical processes which must be understood before the denial can be fully illumined. Without historical knowledge, he argues even our decisions will suffer (p. 14). Randall calls his approach to defining philosophical problems "operational." Accordingly, we do not know whether we have a philosophical problem until a philosophical response has occurred. Looking back from the response to what it was that philosophers responded to, we See Randall's "Arthur O. Lovejoy and the History of Ideas," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,XXII (1963), 475-479; also book under review, p. 36. [1071 108 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY discover that these were problems that emerged "whenever strife of ideas and experiences forced men back to the fundamental assumptions in any field" (p. 18). Briefly put, the response has always been that of analysing, clarifying, criticizing and reconstructing "fundamental assumptions." The problems vary and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:260 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY and 8, although hc proposed no emendation of the text. [Raven's work is nowhere mentioned by Loenen, not even in connection with fr. 4 where he and Raven are in agreement, yet where he says "... all present-day authors assume this passage to refer to the material world," Raven believes with Loenen that the passage does not refer to the material world.] With regard to (...) Loenen's sensu stricto ~ar~, all commentators realized that Parmenides was at least some of the time using ~a~Lto denote necessity of existence and essence. Loenen does valuable work in emphasising this, but the observation is not revolutionarily original. Vlastos, following yon Fritz, argued (in Gnomon [1953]) that, for Parmenides, nothing exists but thought. Vlastos' arguments were not on as many fronts as are Loenen's, and Loenen develops the interpretation much further. Aristotle and Simplicius were the first of many who believed Parmenides to be a dualist, to have posited two worlds, fa ata~ra and ~& ~a~a, between which there was no causal relationship. Although there is much originality in Loenen's development and argument for his theses, it is nevertheless true that on the three grounds on which he lays claim to originality (introduction, pp. 3-5), his views have considerable precedents. M. C. SCHOLAR St. John's College, Cambridge Plato and the Individual. By Robert William Hall. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963. Pp. 224.) Professor Hall's main thesis is that Plato's ethical thought underwent a gradual and significant development and that in the face of this fact the mature Plato is neither a halfhearted moral philosopher, nor a utilitarian, but completely committed to the substantiality and immortality of the soul. The first issue is raised so that the claim that Plato reserved the ethical ideal only for the specialists in philosophical reflection can be dismissed as groundless. The second problem is discussed in order to demonstrate beyond doubt that Plato's later moral views went beyond the limited ethics of consequences that dominates the early Socratic dialogues. But it is the third issue that constitutes the core of Hall's book, and the discussion here is undertaken in order to identify the metaphysical principle to which Plato appealed when he reconstructed his ethics from an initially quite aristocratic affair into a publicly available ideal that was rendered universal in scope and attainment. Dr. Hall argues that if knowledge of the Forms is unconditionally required for genuine morality, then only the philosophically gifted can rise to the lofty occasion. Being himself a strong advocate of a moral ideal open to all human beings, Dr. Hall does not hesitate to challenge Plato's views with this formidable problem: If we suppose Plato's views grant to the ordinary individual nothing more than a second class morality, he hardly deserves his reputation as a great ethical thinker. In line with this question the author devotes the entire first chapter to an interesting discussion on the sources of modern democratic individualism as supported by the best in the Christian tradition and then uses his findings to test the strength of Plato's moral fiber. But the author knows all along that Plato will emerge unscathed. His purpo~ then is not so much to show that Plato actually held that view as it is to take the reader through the meandering paths only the modem scholar and erudite interpreter of the dialogues know how to travel best and by which it is believed Plato himself must have been able to reach the summit of the superb answer. Since Dr. Hall discerns two different available moralities in Plato, an "aristocratic" and a "demotic," he also finds it necessary to distinguish between the morality of the excellences of the individual man and the excellence of the philosopher. When all is told, it turns out that Plato's development as an ethical philosopher moves from a high-minded kind of utilitarianism based on arete, inherited from Socrates, to a non-utilitarian conception of virtue which is Plato's own discovery and contribution. The pivotal point is found to be in the Republic where the central problem is to justify the inherent value of... (shrink)

With the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), global researchers were confronted with major challenges. The German National Pandemic Cohort Network (NAPKON) was launched in fall 2020 to effectively leverage resources and bundle research activities in the fight against the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. We analyzed the setup phase of NAPKON as an example for multicenter studies in Germany, highlighting challenges and optimization potential in connecting 59 university and nonuniversity study sites. We examined the ethics application (...) process of 121 ethics submissions considering durations, annotations, and outcomes. Study site activation and recruitment processes were investigated and related to the incidence of SARS-CoV-2 infections. For all initial ethics applications, the median time to a positive ethics vote was less than two weeks and 30 of these study sites (65%) joined NAPKON within less than three weeks each. Electronic instead of postal ethics submission (9.5 days (Q1: 5.75, Q3: 17) vs. 14 days (Q1: 11, Q3: 26), p value = 0.01) and adoption of the primary ethics vote significantly accelerated the ethics application process. Each study center enrolled a median of 37 patients during the 14-month observation period, with large differences depending on the health sector. We found a positive correlation between recruitment performance and COVID-19 incidence as well as hospitalization incidence. Our analysis highlighted the challenges and opportunities of the federated system in Germany. Digital ethics application tools, adoption of a primary ethics vote and standardized formal requirements lead to harmonized and thus faster study initiation processes during a pandemic. (shrink)

Peter Singer’s defense of the duty to aid the world’s poor by the pond analogy is self-defeating. It cannot be both true that you ought to save the drowning child from a pond at the expense of ruining your shoes and that you ought to aid the world’s poor if you thereby do not sacrifice anything of comparable moral importance. Taking the latter principle seriously would lead you to let the child in front of you drown whenever you could (...) thereby save more children in the developing world. Though Singer can defend the duty to aid the world’s poor starting from consequentialist principles requiring you to make things go best in the impartial sense, he cannot have it invoking the commonsense judgment about what you ought to do in the pond case. There is no sound path from commonsense morality to Singer’s principles of beneficence. (shrink)

I re-question the Enlightenment by bringing together Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Peter Sloterdijk’s Critique of Cynical Reason. The year 2021 celebrates the 240th and 40th anniversary of the respective Critiques, and it is opportune to read the common thread that binds them—the Enlightenment. This essay has three parts: I first read the Critique of Pure Reason in light of Kant’s Enlightenment essay to underscore reason’s ill-fate as found in the public sphere; I then introduce Sloterdijk’s Critique (...) of Cynical Reason along with his general philosophy, highlighting the cynical state he characterizes reason’s public presence with. In the conclusion, I draw affinities between the two Critiques to form a certain dialogue in the presentation of both philosophers to understand the concept on stage: the Enlightenment. (shrink)

O'Donnell, J. R. Anton Charles Pegis on the occasion of his retirement.--Conlan, W. J. The definition of faith according to a question of MS. Assisi 138: study and edition of text.--Spade, P. V. Five logical tracts by Richard Lavenham.--Maurer, A. Henry of Harclay's disputed question on the plurality of forms.--Brown, V. Giovanni Argiropulo on the agent intellect: an edition of Ms. Magliabecchi V 42.--Synan, E. A. The Exortacio against Peter Abelard's Dialogus inter philosophum, Iudaeum et Christianum.--Fitzgerald, W. Nugae (...) Hyginianae.--Sheehan, M. M. Marriage and family in English conciliar and synodal legislation.--Shook, L. K. Riddles relating to the Anglo-Saxon scriptorium.--Boyle, L. E. The De regno and the two powers.--Colledge, E. A Middle English Christological poem.--Gough, M. R. E. Three forgotten martyrs of Anazarbus in Cilicia.--Häring, N. Chartres and Paris revisited.--Hayes, W. Greek recentiores, (Ps.) Basil, Adversus eunomium, IV-V.--Owens, J. The physical world of Parmenides. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Benedict XVI, A Life: Volume 1, Youth in Nazi Germany to the Second Vatican Council 1927–1965 by Peter SeewaldEmil AntonBenedict XVI, A Life: Volume 1, Youth in Nazi Germany to the Second Vatican Council 1927–1965 by Peter Seewald, translated by Dinah Livingstone (London: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2020), xi + 500 pp.What better way to spend Pope Benedict XVI's ninety-fourth birthday than by reviewing a Ratzinger biography while (...) having Apfelstrudel and some traditional Bavarian beer?German journalist and author Peter Seewald, who in his many interviews has asked Joseph Ratzinger / Pope Benedict XVI a total of two thousand or more questions (ix), has written a splendid biography that surprises even someone who has already read dozens of books by and about Benedict XVI. Written in an extremely enjoyable style and divided into chapters of just the perfect length, this page-turner deserves the highest praise. It will likely take its place alongside George Weigel's famous (and equally massive) biography of Pope John Paul II, Witness to Hope.The German biography has been divided into two volumes in English (vol. 2 was just published in November of 2021). Volume 1 deals with the years 1927–1965, dominated by two historic "Twos": World War II and Vatican II. Theologically, this is the period of the progressive Ratzinger (regardless of whether he "converted" to a more conservative stance later on), or as Seewald puts it, a man formed by "liberal Bavarian Catholicism" (124).Seewald provides lots of new and interesting information about Joseph Ratzinger, both bitter and sweet. One example from the early chapters concerns the origins of Ratzinger's mother. It turns out that she was an illegitimate child and not actually from South Tyrol, contrary to what her children had thought. A local historian has discovered that Ratzinger's mother Maria was actually born in Mühlbach "in the district of Rosenheim,... in a house that specialized in helping unmarried pregnant women to give birth" (15).For the romantic, the sweetest story of the book comes when Seewald [End Page 963] pushes the reserved Pope Emeritus to reveal more about the "painful decisions" that the young Munich seminarian had to make in relation to his vocation as a celibate priest. "'Were you in love with a girl?' 'Perhaps.' 'So, yes?' 'It could be interpreted like that.' 'How long did this passionate time last? A few weeks? A few months?' 'Longer'" (219). Ratzinger was in love! Or at least it could be interpreted like that! Other heart-warming details include the revelation that Ratzinger's childhood teddy from Marktl followed him all the way to the Apostolic Palace, as well as the fact that, when his blind brother Georg (now deceased) needed a housekeeper, Benedict XVI personally organized the job interview in the Vatican gardens.A darker episode, minimized in Ratzinger's autobiographical memoirs, concerns his role in the radar crew of the German anti-aircraft forces in World War II. The future Pope was entrusted with the task of targeting British bombers. Seewald fills in the narrative: "Ratzinger delivered readings for three guns,.... The more precisely Joseph measured, the higher the hit rate. As the war demanded" (101). Years later, Ratzinger confessed that these experiences still occasionally gave him sweaty nightmares.Seewald goes on to describe the exceptional postwar context in which Ratzinger prepared for the priesthood. The future priests knew that they would soon have to hear confessions of ex-Nazis who had shot people in the war (153). Indeed, after the war, many old Nazis turned to the Church and attempted to get de-Nazification certificates. Ratzinger's parish priest even joked that one day "they will say the only Nazis were the priests" (131).As did everyone, Ratzinger also felt the effects of poverty in postwar Germany. Whenever a festive dinner had to be given for a visitor at the seminary, "we went hungry on the most meagre rations for four long weeks in order to gather the ingredients" (189). After a short period of pastoral ministry subsequent to his ordination, the stellar theologian went back to the seminary as a teacher. Barely twenty-five-years-old, he was younger... (shrink)

The article gives an overview on arguments typically used within discussions on the ethical aspects of abortion. Five types of argument especially are analyzed more closely. Only one type withstands critical scrutiny: so-called interest-arguments, arguments referring to whether or when being killed (as involved in abortion) is against the interest of the fetus. In critical revision of a proposal due to Peter Singer the result is that abortion should be seen as morally neutral up to four months of pregnancy.

David Gray Carlson and Peter Goodrich argue that the postmodern legal mind can be characterized as having shifted the focus of legal analysis away from the modernist understanding of law as a system that is unitary and separate from other aspects of culture and society. In exploring the various "other dimensions" of law, scholars have developed alternative species of legal analysis and recognized the existence of different forms of law. Carlson and Goodrich assert that the postmodern legal mind introduced (...) a series of "minor jurisprudences" or partial forms of legal knowledge, which both compete with and subvert the modernist conception of a unitary system of law. In doing so scholars from a variety of disciplines pursue the implications of applying the insights of their disciplines to law. Carlson and Goodrich have assembled in this volume essays from some of our leading thinkers that address what is arguably one of the most fundamental of interdisciplinary encounters, that of psychoanalysis and law. While psychoanalytic interpretations of law are by no means a novelty within common law jurisprudence, the extent and possibilities of the terrain opened up by psychoanalysis have yet to be extensively addressed. The intentional subject and "reasonable man" of law are disassembled in psychoanalysis to reveal a chaotic and irrational libidinal subject, a sexual being, a body and its drives. The focus of the present collection of essays is upon desire as an inner law, upon love as an interior idiom of legality, and represents a signficant and at times surprising development of the psychoanalytic analysis of legality. These essays should appeal to scholars in law and in psychology. The contributors are Drucilla Cornell, Jacques Derrida, Peter Goodrich, Pierre Legendre, Alain Pottage, Michel Rosenfeld, Renata Salecl, Jeanne L. Schroeder, Anton Schutz, Henry Staten, and Slavoj Zizek. David Gray Carlson is Professor of Law, Benjamin Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. Peter Goodrich is Professor of Law, University of London and University of California, Los Angeles. (shrink)